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U.S. Tax Treaties

Third-Country Use:
Is Time
Running Out?
by STEVEN P. HANNES / Partner, Washington Service Center

T

he U.S. has had income tax
treaties with foreign nations
since 1939. The network of U.S.
income tax treaties has expanded
significantly since then, especially in
the last decade. With those that were
ratified by the Senate in 1981, the U.S.
now has 35 such treaties in force, with
two others awaiting ratification
overseas.
Now, however, this expansion is
threatened by claims that U.S. tax
treaties are being improperly used by
residents of "third"countries (not the
U.S. or its treaty partner) at times
with the blessing of the U.S. treaty
partner. Claims of such treaty abuse or
"treaty shopping" also threaten existing
treaty relationships with the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and
Switzerland.
What effect do income tax treaties
have on the U.S. economy? In 1978, $3.9
billion of income was paid to residents
of tax treaty countries who had U.S.
investments. This represented 87
percent of the income earned by

foreign persons on U.S. investments. If
one assumes a 10 percent return on
investment, this means U.S. investments
held by or through treaty country
residents totaled at least $39 billion in
1978. Thus, the treaties provide protection for significant amounts of crossborder investments. Critics claim,
however, that some of these treaties are
being used improperly, thereby
depriving the U.S. of needed and
legitimate tax revenue.
Statistics published in 1981 in a widely
publicized U.S. government report, Tax
Havens and Their Use by United States
Taxpayers—An Overview, suggest that
certain jurisdictions with low tax rates
which have tax treaties with the United
States are vehicles for disproportionately large amounts of both U.S. investment overseas and foreign investment
into the United States. According to the
report, U.S. gross dividends, interest,
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and other payments made in 1978 to
inhabitants of Switzerland and the
Netherlands Antilles represented
30 percent of all U.S. payments to
nonresident aliens. Other data in the
report points to a five-fold increase
between 1968 and 1976 in the assets of
U.S.-controlled corporations formed in
tax havens. By 1978, U.S. direct investments overseas in tax haven jurisdictions were more than $23 billion; in
1968, the figure had been approximately
$4.7 billion. Several of these tax haven
jurisdictions, the British Virgin Islands,
Luxembourg, Netherlands Antilles, and
Switzerland, have U.S. income tax
treaties.
Depending on one's perspective,
these published figures merely confirm
the best hopes or worst fears of many
concerning the use of U.S. income tax
treaties. That is, for some time many
people have believed that U.S. and
foreign taxpayers were using U.S.
income tax treaties with tax havens to
channel investment from and to the
United States and to and from residents
in countries without U.S. tax treaties.
One of the principal objectives of this
pattern of investment through treaty
countries has been to reduce income
tax in the country where the investment
is finally made—the "source"country.
Is the long-range impact of this
cross-border investment strategy
harmful to U.S. interests? Should the
U.S. Treasury proceed with its
announced policy of curtailing or
ending third-country use of U.S. tax
treaties with low-tax jurisdictions? Is the
issue really one of lost U.S. tax revenue?
This article explores these questions.
How U.S. Tax Treaties Are Used
An April 27,1982, report on the United
States Model Income Tax Convention
prepared by the New York State Bar
Association illustrates how U.S. tax
treaties are used. "It is common knowledge, for example, that Canadian direct
investment in the United States almost
invariably is made through Netherlands
holding companies, since the U.S.
withholding tax on dividends and
interest paid to a Netherlands corporation (generally 5 percent and zero,
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respectively) is substantially less than
the U.S. withholding tax on interest and
dividends paid to Canada (currently 15
percent) and the Netherlands permits
holding companies for this purpose in
consideration of the payment of a
nominal amount of income tax. For the
same reasons, Australian direct investment tends to flow through Netherlands Antilles structures; and substantial
investments from countries with whom
the U.S. has no tax treaties have been
channeled through the Netherlands,
the Netherlands Antilles, and the British
Virgin Islands."
Such third-country use of U.S. tax
treaties raises a number of questions
and issues. For inbound investments,
treaties that are easily used by residents
of third countries give a U.S. treaty
partner, such as the Netherlands
Antilles, the extraordinary right to
determine who will receive U.S. tax
breaks. Also important, easy and
favorable access to the United States
through a low-tax U.S. treaty jurisdiction
eliminates an incentive for other
jurisdictions to create their own direct
treaty relationship with the United
States.
Similarly, a country with a tax treaty
relationship with the United States may
be unwilling to revise that treaty to
make a tax concession to United States
investors if its own nationals already
can achieve low United States taxation
by using other treaties. For example, if
Canadian or German investors can
reduce United States tax by going
through the Netherlands Antilles, then
Canada or West Germany may think it
unnecessary to revise downward the
tax burden in the Canada-United States
or Germany-United States income tax
treaties. In such circumstances, Canada
or West Germany might think
(correctly) it would be making a
unilateral concession by reducing the
tax burden in its treaty with the United
States.
Thus, from the perspective of the
United States government, the thirdcountry-use issue involves (1) having

the United States regain control
over who receives U.S. tax benefits,
(2) expanding the U.S. treaty network to
cover developing countries, and
(3) having better leverage to improve
current U.S. tax treaties, particularly
those with a few developed countries.
The issue of "better leverage"cannot be
overemphasized. For example, West
Germany continues to refuse to agree
to tax treaty modifications to ameliorate
the recently enacted West German tax
that discriminates against U.S. investment in West Germany. Many believe
that the German government would be
more willing to renegotiate the U.S.Germany treaty if West German
residents with U.S. investments could
not continue to reduce unilaterally their
U.S. taxes by going through third
countries with more favorable U.S. tax
treaties.
Use Once Tolerated by Treasury
At the same time, it is widely recognized
that third-country use of treaties brings
needed capital into the U.S. and that
prior policies and practices of the
Treasury tolerated if not encouraged
third-country use of tax treaties. For
example, significant Eurodollar debt
offerings have been and continue to be
placed by U.S. companies through the
Netherlands Antilles to reduce their
interest costs and bring down the U.S.
tax cost of such financing. Until
recently, the IRS blessed or ignored this
situation. Moreover, the Treasury
recognized the economic advantage of
the Eurodollar source of capital when
it supported legislation last year
(H.R. 4618) that would amend the
Internal Revenue Code to unilaterally
allow tax-free Eurodollar financings that
otherwise might be placed through the
Netherlands Antilles.
Similarly, U.S. companies with foreign
subsidiaries want to reduce their
foreign taxes and have used other treaty
networks, such as the Netherlands
network, to accomplish this objective
for investments in countries not having
U.S. treaties. This objective generally
has not been criticized from tax policy
grounds. Indeed, the Treasury and IRS
believe that reducing foreign tax

liability is a valid business goal from the
U.S. perspective. The Treasury has tried
to conclude income tax treaties with
countries such as Brazil and Indonesia
that are important areas of investment
for U.S. persons. One objective of these
treaties would be to reduce Brazilian
and Indonesian tax on U.S investment
there. Similarly the Treasury's interest in
attracting capital from third-country
users of U.S. tax treaties has been
reflected in its often expressed desire to
conclude tax reducing treaties with
countries such as Saudi Arabia that are
important sources for capital investment into the U.S. and thought to be
heavy third-country users of U.S. tax
treaties.
In the end, modifications to the
Internal Revenue Code and new direct
treaty relationships could protect much
of the U.S. tax savings currently enjoyed
by those using a treaty country as
intermediary. From the U.S. government's perspective, the issue of is not
U.S. tax revenue per se. Through an
expanded U.S. treaty network, a U.S.
investment overseas might, in fact, bear
less foreign tax than this investment
bears today by going through an
intermediary treaty jurisdiction. Thus,
the issue is not, from a U.S. perspective,
whether a few treaties encourage an
outflow of U.S. capital. The issues are, as
explained above, ones of regaining
control over U.S. tax benefits, expanding
the treaty network, and obtaining
leverage to improve current U.S. tax
treaties.
Origin of Current Focus
The current focus on third-country use
of tax treaties can be traced to a
favorable 1975 IRS ruling concerning the
third-country-use issue. That is, thirdcountry use of U.S. income tax treaties
was officially and favorably highlighted
when the IRS published Rev. Rul. 75-23,
1975-1 C.B. 290, which involved a
Netherlands Antilles corporation
organized "primarily to invest foreign
capital"in major commercial real estate
projects in the U.S. This ruling held that

U.S. taxes were reduced by reason of
the U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax
Convention as extended to the Netherlands Antilles. The ruling surprised
many and was widely perceived as a
road map, acceptable to the IRS, for
third-country investment in the U.S.
through the Netherlands Antilles.
While the Treasury apparently
believed that the Netherlands Antilles
Convention authorized third-country
investment, Rev. Rul. 75-23 highlighted
a general issue that the Treasury
decided warranted action. Shortly after
publication of this ruling, the Treasury
announced that at least certain types of
third-country use of U.S. income tax
treaties were unacceptable as a matter
of policy. This announcement came in
1976, when the Treasury Department
published the first U.S. Model Income
Tax Convention. The 1976 model
contained a provision, Article 16,
designed to curtail certain forms of
third-country use of U.S. tax treaties. It
focused on dividends, interest, and
royalties, and denied treaty benefits
only if the treaty partner's tax on such
income was less than the tax it generally
imposed.
Earlier in 1976, the Treasury had given
a warning that it was adopting a general
policy of curtailing third-country use of
U.S. tax treaties when it released the
then proposed U.S.-U.K. Income Tax
Convention, which contained a limited
Article-16-type provision. When the U.S
model was republished in May 1977, it
adhered to the 1976 model's policy and
provisions against certain types of
third-country use.
As the Treasury continued to negotiate treaties following the policies
of Article 16, and as the issue concerning treaty shopping received
more attention, it became apparent that
Article 16 of the 1977 model easily could
be avoided. As a result, treaty shopping
was continuing, and the Treasury's
commitment to end third-country use
was questioned. For example, hearings
were held by the House of Representatives which focused on this and other
treaty issues. [5ee Income Tax Treaties:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 96, 2nd Sess. (1980).]
During the hearings, Article 16 of the
1977 model was criticized as ineffective.

Commitment to End Use
In June 1981 the Treasury demonstrated
its commitment to end most thirdcountry use. The Treasury published a
new draft-model U.S. Income Tax
Convention. The draft revised and
updated the 1977 model in a number of
ways, one of the most important of
which was to reform substantially
Article 16 so that it broadly attacked
treaty shopping. The article applies to
source-basis tax benefits for all types of
income, not just dividends, interest, and
royalties.
Under the draft, treaty benefits are
denied whether or not the treaty
country reduces its tax on the income
in question. The focus is on thirdcountry ownership, not on the tax
burden imposed by the treaty partner.
As a general rule, when a third-country
resident owns 25 percent or more of a
tax treaty corporation, treaty benefits
are denied under the 1981 draft—unless,
for example, the corporation has an
active business in the treaty country
and there is a business purpose for the
third-country resident making the
investments in the U.S. through the
treaty corporation.
On September 15,1981, the Treasury
turned the screws even further when it
stated in a letter to the chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Charles H. Percy that the
Treasury was withdrawing from the
Senate the proposed income tax
treaties with Cyprus and the British
Virgin Islands. These treaties had been
negotiated by the Carter administration,
and both had relatively sophisticated
provisions designed to limit the extent
to which residents of third countries
could use these two treaties to receive
U.S. tax benefits.
Based on its review of these treaties,
the Reagan Treasury concluded that the
opportunities which potentially
remained for such third countries were
"too great for us to tolerate." The
Treasury threatened, moreover, that if

satisfactory negotiations were not
concluded by early 1982, the Reagan
administration would serve notice of
termination for the existing British
Virgin islands (BVI) Convention. On
June 30,1982, the Treasury followed
through on its threat. On that date the
U.S., through the acting secretary of
state, terminated the BVI treaty,
effective January 1,1983.
Provisions to Prevent Treaty Shopping
At this time, negotiations are underway
between the U.S. and three jurisdictions
currently being used by residents of
third countries to invest in the U.S.
These are the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Switzerland. At least
one of these three, the Netherlands, is a
significant route for U.S. investment in
developing countries.
Treasury officials have openly stated
on many occasions that these three
negotiations involve, among other
things, the third-country-use issue, and
that it is the Treasury's objective to add
to the new tax treaties with these
jurisdictions, as well as to tax treaties
with other countries, strong provisions
designed to prevent treaty shopping.
Based on the public statements and
actions of the Treasury Department
through July 1982, perhaps no more
than four years will pass before thirdcountry use of U.S. tax treaties will have
been substantially eliminated.
The time required to curtail thirdcountry use of U.S tax treaties depends,
in part, upon legislation that would
change the Internal Revenue Code to
allow tax-free Eurodollar financings and
thereby cut down on the role of the
Antilles Convention. If the 30 percent
U.S. withholding tax were repealed—or
amended so that it did not apply to the
type of Eurodollar offering currently
running through the Netherlands
Antilles—then U.S. dependence on the
Netherlands Antilles for financing
would end and the Treasury would
have greater leverage in its negotiations
with the Netherlands Antilles.
Conversely, if the statutory 30 percent
withholding tax on interest is not
amended, more time will be required
for the Treasury to conclude the
Netherlands Antilles negotiations.
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(With new code provisions imposing,
for the first time, domestic withholding
on dividends and interest, it is unlikely
that the Congress will enact legislation
to exempt foreign persons from U.S.
withholding taxes on interest.)
Alternatively, one probable compromise open to the Treasury is to allow
the Netherlands Antilles to continue to
be, at least for a period of time, a
vehicle for Eurodollar financing by U.S.
companies. This would recognize the
unique status of the Netherlands
Antilles, a status officially tolerated, if
not encouraged, in the past by the
Treasury.
Meanwhile, U.S. persons investing
outside the U.S. and foreign persons
investing in the U.S. already find
themselves having to adjust to new
rules and policies. Termination of the
British Virgin Islands treaty at the end of
1982 certainly will cause some restructuring. If the Treasury's objective of
curtailing third-country use is realized,
there will be additional dislocation or
relocation of U.S. investments by
foreign persons who have used the
Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, and
Switzerland treaties.
One possibility for the future is that
countries which do not now have U.S.
income tax treaties will establish a
direct income tax treaty relationship
with the U.S. Thus, investors from these
countries will be able to save U.S. taxes
directly and perhaps duplicate or better
the tax savings they currently enjoy
through treaties with favorable, low
source-rates of tax, such as those with
the Netherlands and Netherlands
Antilles. Where such treaty relationships are not possible, investors will
have to consider whether the additional
tax burden is so great as to require
divestiture.

consideration, and even without special
tax treaty benefits U.S. taxes can be
reduced through proper planning to a
level that appears low by comparison to
the tax burden of other countries. Thus,
an increase in U.S. taxes due to the
scheduled termination or revision of
U.S. treaties might be tolerated by some
investors.
The U.S. corporations and individuals
investing in developing countries
through other treaty jurisdictions will
certainly encourage the Treasury to
expand the U.S. tax treaty network as
the Treasury limits third-country use. It
is difficult to predict how fast the U.S.
treaty network can expand or whether
the source-basis foreign tax benefits
achieved through an expanded network
will be comparable to those currently
enjoyed. Certainly, U.S. persons
investing overseas will applaud efforts
that help the Treasury achieve more
favorable treatment from our current
treaty partners, such as Canada and
West Germany.
In conclusion, it remains to be seen
whether the potential cost of the
Treasury's anti-treaty-shopping program
—a potential reduction in the flow of
capital to the United States and a
possible increase in the foreign tax
liability of U.S. persons investing in
countries without U.S. tax treaties-will
be temporary or permanent, small or
great. It is clear, however, that the
real motivating force of the antitreaty-shopping program is not, as such,
U.S. tax revenue. The issue is whether
the U.S. government will regain control
over the U.S. tax system to expand the
U.S. tax treaty network, improve
existing treaty relationships, and target
U.S. tax savings on inbound investment
to particular countries.
£

Conclusion
Foreign persons are frequently attracted
to U.S. investments because of the
relative economic and political stability
of the U.S. Tax benefits are a secondary
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